Kosovo Prishtina Kosova

CGG: Government is manipulating to avoid the public pressure

2007-04-08T19:49:00.000+01:00

CGG: Government is manipulating to avoid the public pressure
06.04.2007 ET Prishtina (KosovaLive)

The head of the Department of Energy and Mining of the Cabinet of Good Governance (CGG), Bajrush Xhemajli opposed today the decision to increase the electricity price, because of the extremely difficult situation in this sector.

Unity Team still without a decision over the state symbols competition

2007-04-08T19:48:00.000+01:00

Unity Team still without a decision over the state symbols competition
06.04.2007 ET Pristhina (KosovaLive)

Kosova Unity Team has discussed today the issue of symbols, while according to them there is still no final decision as when will they announce the state symbol competition.

Kosovo President Reiterates Kosovo Albanians Call for Independence

2007-01-16T00:51:00.000Z

Kosovo President Reiterates Kosovo Albanians' Call for Independence

In an interview at the Voice of America (VOA) Monday, Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu thanked the United States for its longstanding efforts in support of the people of Kosovo, and reaffirmed his province's call for independence.

In a live interview with VOA's Albanian-language TV show Ditari (Journal), President Sejdiu said the United States "has made a huge investment in favor of Kosovo and its citizens. " President Sejdiu and Kosovo Prime Minister Agim eku are scheduled to meet with U. S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to discuss progress achieved in the negotiations on the final status of Kosovo.

The United Nations is leading talks to determine Kosovo's future. Albanians in Kosovo insist on full independence, while the Belgrade government wants it to remain part of Serbia. President Sejdiu said that his government "will help the Serbian minority integrate in the institutions and establish constitutional guarantees for them. " He called this "a sincere offer. "

President Sejdiu firmly rejected any proposition aimed at partitioning Kosovo, suggesting that such ideas stem from Belgrade. He also stressed that the mandate of his government is independence for Kosovo.

VOA has played a unique role in broadcasting news and information to Kosovo's Albanian and Serb populations directly, via television. Both Serbian and Albanian politicians have given interviews to VOA in which they addressed members of each other's ethnic communities.

VOA Albanian's popular TV news program Ditari is broadcast 30 minutes each day to audiences throughout the Balkans. VOA also transmits 10. 5 hours a week of news in Albanian via shortwave. For more information on this broadcast and VOA Albanian programming, visit our web site on the Internet at www. VOANews. com/Albanian.

Kosovo bids for independence face to face with Serbs

2007-01-16T00:50:00.000Z

Kosovo bids for independence face-to-face with Serbs

Kosovo formally made its pitch for independence face-to-face with Serbia on Monday at their first top-level talks since NATO bombs drove Serb forces from the province in 1999.

The one-day meeting in Vienna placed the Albanian majority's demand for independence on the agenda of a U. N. -led mediation process that began in February, seven years since the West intervened to halt a wave of ethnic cleansing and the United Nations took control. Kosovo's ethnic Albanian President Fatmir Sejdiu said independence was "the beginning and end of our position."

"The will for independence cannot be ignored or negotiated away in talks," he said, according to a copy of his speech.

Across the table, aides said Serbian President Boris Tadic predictably rejected the "ultimatum," setting the tone for talks that gave little hint of the compromise urged by the West.

It was the first time the presidents and prime ministers of both sides had held direct talks since Serbia's 1998-99 war with ethnic Albanian guerrillas. Some 10, 000 Albanian civilians died and 800, 000 fled, marking the culmination of a decade of Serb repression under late strongman Slobodan Milosevic.

Seven turbulent years later, the West says Kosovo's economic and political limbo is unsustainable. It wants a settlement within the year, which diplomats say will likely bring some form of independence with or without Serbian consent.

The two delegations avoided handshakes, entering the Gothic Room of the Vienna palace from opposite ends. Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica opted out of a joint lunch with the Kosovo delegation, which included two former guerrillas.

"It was business-like," one U. N. official said of the talks.

GOING ITS OWN WAY

U. N. chief mediator Martti Ahtisaari had played down hopes of a breakthrough, given what diplomats say is an unbridgeable chasm between the two sides. Some 90 percent of Kosovo's 2 million people are Albanians who reject any return to Serb rule.

But Serbia sees Kosovo as its "Jerusalem," the cradle of Serbdom and home to scores of centuries-old Orthodox churches.

Kostunica said Belgrade could offer "substantial autonomy." But it "cannot accept the creation of a separate state on 15 percent of its territory."

Too little too late, said Kosovo negotiator Veton Surroi. "After everything we've been through, it is unrealistic to discuss modalities of autonomy. Kosovo will go its own way."

Ahtisaari opened lower-level direct talks in February on the rights of 100, 000 Serbs still in Kosovo, with little success.

Diplomats say the major powers see little alternative to independence, supervised for years by the European Union.

The United States is pushing hard for a deal in 2006, concerned that delay could spark fresh violence in a territory patrolled by 17, 000 NATO soldiers. Russia, a veto holder in the U. N. Security Council and traditional ally of Serbia, has cautioned against any "artificial timetable."

Half the Serb population fled a wave of revenge attacks in 1999. Many who stayed live in isolated enclaves, and view the prospect of independence from Serbia with increasing trepidation. The mainly Serb north has threatened partition.

Kosovo needs status deal to start talks with EU, commission says

2007-01-16T00:49:00.000Z

Kosovo needs status deal to start talks with EU, commission says

The European Commission on Wednesday called for a 'politically and legally clear' status settlement for Serbia's breakaway province of Kosovo, saying this was vital for starting negotiations on aspired European Union membership.

EU enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn said that Kosovo needed a status treaty 'to enter into contractual relationships with the EU' for negotiating a stabilization and association deal, seen as the first step on the long way to EU accession.

The commission also urged Serbia to 'take a constructive approach on Kosovo' while commending Belgrade for responsible behaviour following Montenegro's independence last June.

Negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo are stalled with Pristina demanding full independence for the Serb province inhabited mostly by ethnic Albanians who want independence Kosovo, and Belgrade refusing it and instead offering some sort of autonomy for the province.

In a progress report on Kosovo, the commission said that the focus on the status issue has delayed reforms in key areas such as the rule of law, economy and public administration.

Kosovo's administration remained weak and judicial bodies made little progress in civil and criminal justice, the report said, adding that corruption remained widespread.

Pristina must also step up its fight against organised crime, the trafficking of human beings and drugs, agriculture statistics and property rights, the commission said.

The EU executive also urged Kosovo to end the discrimination of minority groups and to improve the conditions for the return of war refugees and displaced persons.

The commission also said that Kosovo made little progress towards becoming a functioning market economy and urged Pristina to tackle the high unemployment rate.

A report on Serbia highlighted Belgrade's failure to arrest Bosnian Serb wartime leader Ratko Mladic and several other war crimes suspects and deliver them to International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague.

Negotiations on a stabilization and association pact with the EU will be resumed 'as soon as full cooperation with the ICTY is achieved,' the commission reiterated.

It also said that Serbia's constitution presented 'some areas of concern, notably in relation to the independence of the judiciary.'

Belgrade must also step up its fight against corruption and implement civilian control over the military.

In addition, the commission pressed Serbia for more economic reforms, including strong fiscal adjustment.

More work was also needed in areas such as taxation, state aid, public procurement, intellectual property rights, consumer protection, food safety, environment, information society and financial control, the EU executive said.

Serbia must make more efforts on visa policy, border control, asylum, police and security services reform, the fight against organised crime and the protection of personal data, it added.

The 25-member EU in May suspended talks with the union of Serbia and Montenegro on a stabilization and association pact over the failure to arrest Mladic and other war crimes suspects and deliver them to the ICTY.

Negotiations with Montenegro, however, were resumed in September.

Tetovo University Anniversary, Incident

2007-01-16T00:43:00.000Z

Tetovo University Anniversary, Incident

Wednesday evening the observance of the 12th anniversary of Tetovo University ended up with injured people who were taken to hospital. A group of about ten people claim they were beaten up by the security of DPA vice-president Menduh Thaci, which they interpret as a punishment for their exclamations ‘Fascist, Nationalist’ during the speech of Parliament Speaker Ljubisa Georgievski.

His address in Albanian proved to be insufficient to gain the sympathies of all those who were present. Thaci claims the incident was politically motivated by people close to Ahmeti.

The security removed the group of dissatisfied. One person from the same group claims that immediately afterwards he was beaten up by Thaci’s security of about twenty to thirty people: “We know how much pain Georgievski caused to the Albanians. He was against this university and he cannot come to such a ceremony and express such words. He does not exist for us.” After the incident Thaci declared he had no information that anybody had been beaten up by the security. Georgievski did not see this as an incident. Tetovo University was legalised in January 2004.

Macedonia - Kosovo Border Demarcation

2007-01-16T00:42:00.000Z

Macedonia-Kosovo Border Demarcation

In the latest report of the International Crisis Group on Kosovo, the demarcation of the Kosovo-Macedonian border is not mentioned as one of the issues which are part of resolving Kosovo’s status.

According to the Europe Programme Director in the ICG, Nicholas Whyte, senior representatives of the Macedonian authorities requested the border not to be part of the negotiations on Kosovo, in order to avoid Macedonia being put in Kosovo’s context. The final decision will be passed by the Security Council and therefore it is illogical for Macedonia to ask from the UN to decide on this issue, which has already been resolved with the agreement concluded between Belgrade and Skopje in 2001, they said in ICG. “This position was clearly stated by the Macedonian representatives of all political parties. They did not want to be part of the Kosovo process from the beginning, but a consequence of this position is that the demarcation issue cannot be part of the final package for Kosovo,” Whyte stated. The expectations of Skopje - Macedonia not to be part of Kosovo’s situation - imply that the demarcation issue will definitely not be mentioned in the final package for Kosovo. According to Whyte, this issue will be discussed once it is determined on international level who is Macedonia’s partner in the process of placing border stones. The latest explanations of the ICG are opposite to the requests and promises given thus far – that the demarcation issue will be resolved in the course of negotiations on Kosovo’s final status.

Minister Termkolli invites Serbs to participate in census

2006-11-08T21:41:00.000Z

Minister of Public Services Melihate Termkolli called today on all the Kosovar Serbs to participate in the pilot census process, evaluating it as an important project for all the Kosovars.

Doctors of the family medicine express their solidarity with UCCK strikers

2006-11-08T21:38:00.000Z

Association of Doctors of the Family Medicine of Kosova (ADFMK) supported the demands of the medical workers of University Clinical Workers of Kosova (UCCK).

Kadare voices confident that Kosova is ready for independence

2006-11-08T21:37:00.000Z

Kadare voices confident that Kosova is ready for independence

Famous Albanian writer, Ismail Kadare said today in Prishtina that the Kosovar people is prepared for independence which is expected to happen soon.

Hoon: No speculations before the publication of Ahtisaari’s proposal

2006-11-08T21:36:00.000Z

British Minister for Europe, Geoffrey William Hoon said yesterday that there should be no speculations over the possible content of Ahtisaari’s proposal and over the alternatives of the possible reaction of the Contact Group Member States.

UNMIK supports TRA in removal of illegal antennas

2006-11-08T21:33:00.000Z

UNMIK officials in a regular press briefing on Wednesday in Pristina expressed their support towards TRA for removal of illegal mobile operators antennas situated in areas inhabited from Albanian majority

Proposals for decentralization sacrifice over 30% of Kosova’s territory

2006-11-08T21:23:00.000Z

Izmi Zeka, Chief of PDK Councillors Group in Gjilane told in an interview for Kosovapress that the decentralization process for municipality of Gjilane and region of Anamorava stays “Achilles heel”. According to him, PDK, didn’t change their stand on the decentralization issue, reconfirming the oppose they have for decentralization on ethnic basis.

Zeka confirms that Kosova will be independent and sovereign; however after the status he expects that the policy stays in the second plan, meantime the economical aspect will be the priority of citizens’ and the work will be measured with results.

General Kather Situation in Kosova is stable

2006-11-08T21:21:00.000Z

Kosova needs order in the stage in which she's situated, in meantime stability and order are prove of the responsible behavior of society, people of Kosova and her institutions, told on Wednesday PM Agim Ceku during a meeting with the KFOR Commander, General Lieutenant Rolland Kather.

Government urges mobilization of all factors in fight against corruption

2006-11-08T21:19:00.000Z

Prime Ministers Spokesperson, Ulpiana Lama, told on Wednesday after Government's meeting, that there is no official statement which is different from Contact Group positions, related to timetable for enclosure of process for settlement of Kosova’s status.

Documentary of kosovo War (1998-1999)

2006-10-29T09:41:00.000Z

Best Documentary on the Kosovo war (1998-1999). It is called Frontline: War in Europe. It is the best documentary about what really ... all » happened in Kosovo and during the NATO bombing. The best intereviews, best images, the best composition. Also shows the negotiations of Rambulliet, negotiations between the major powers after Kosovo's liberation. The role of Kosova Liberation Army and the role of NATO in Kosova.

Bill Klington
Richard Holbrooke
Medlin Olbrit
Robert Dole
Ivo Daalder
CFhristopher Hill
William Fillman

Albanians still believe that Kosova status will be resolved this year

2006-10-05T05:06:00.000+01:00

Kosovar institutional and political representatives still believe that Kosova status will be resolved this year, regardless of the announcements of the UN Special envoy for Kosova status, Martti Ahtisaari that he may delay his proposal till the end of the elections in Serbia.

Kosova Kosovo's historical background

2006-08-13T23:11:00.000+01:00

Kosovo's historical background:

"Kosovo" or "Kosova" (1) is the name given to an area in south-eastern Europe, the borders of which have, like its inhabitants, moved and changed through time; people's definitions of putative communities that they identify themselves or categorise others as being a part of have also changed.

[1: "Kosova" is the Albanian and "Kosovo" the Serbian spelling. Places are first named in Albanian and Serbian and then referred to by the primary local spelling. "Kosovo", however, will be used, as that is the common English spelling and using "Kosova" could be seen as contrived point-scoring.]

However those communities are defined, those people's ancestries are always multicultural, whatever their recent genealogy. There is no direct relationship between those people categorised as Serbs, some of whom lived in Kosovo in the Seventh Century and those, some of whom live in Kosovo in the Twenty-First Century, or between those people categorised as Albanians, some of whom lived in Kosovo in the Sixth Century and those, some of whom live in Kosovo in the Twenty-First Century, except for the fact that for a multitude of reasons, some people in each generation have identified themselves and/or categorised others as being "Serbs" or "Albanians".

Kosovo's population has fluctuated as every population has, although obviously more so in the past century and even more so in the past two decades, but it is currently approximately 88% Albanian, 7% Serb, 1.9% Bosnian, 1.7% Roma and 1% Turkish (Statistical Office of Kosovo, 2003), though even these statistics obscure manipulation of censuses, elisions of distinct communities and disregard of others.

"Roma" are Gypsies associated with Kosovo Serbs and "Ashkali" those associated with Kosovo Albanians, but only "Roma" are mentioned and it is unclear whether the Ashkali have been subsumed within the "Roma" or "Albanian" community or whether the Roma have been subsumed within the "Serb" community and "Roma" used to refer to the Ashkali; these also fail to acknowledge the "Egyptian" Gypsies and are contradicted by Gypsies in Prishtine/Pristina and Prizren/Prizren, who identified themselves as "Roma", but categorised those in Mitrovice/Mitrovica as "Serbs". Some people choose to identify themselves as "Eskimos" in order to eschew ethnic and national labels, but they remain unrecognised officially.

Culture-historical archaeologies have identified Albanian origins in the "Illyrian" community first found in the Twelfth Century B.C.E., the "Dardanians" having formed a kingdom within it. Illyria fell under Roman occupation in the Third Century B.C.E. and Dardania was established as a province of the Roman Empire in the Fourth Century C.E. and with its division, as a province of the Byzantine Empire.

In the 1160s the Nemanjid dynasty, under the Catholic-baptised, Orthodox Stefan, emerged; by 1216 C.E., the Serbian kingdom, under the Orthodox Stefan and his Catholic wife, had enveloped all of Kosovo. The autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church was established in 1219 C.E., but its archbishopric only moved to Kosovo at the end of the Thirteenth Century and only became a fully independent patriarchate in 1346 C.E. The Nemanjid dynasty was defeated by the Ottomans in 1371 C.E., their territory swallowed up by other, ascending Serbian families, the most powerful of which was led by Lazar.

On the 15th of June 1389, at what came to be known as the Battle of Kosovo, the Ottoman army, which included Serb and Albanian leaders and soldiers, won a Pyrrhic victory over the Serbs' hero Lazar's army, which also included both Serb and Albanian leaders and soldiers. It was the remnants of the equally ravaged Ottoman army that held the field, but it was Lazar's son, Stefan, who ruled the land after the battle - and he did so as a Turkish vassal from 1390.

Quarrels between local and Ottoman elites led the Ottomans to rule Kosovo directly between 1439 and 1444 C.E. and by the 21st of June 1455, a consolidated Ottoman Empire had brought all of Kosovo under direct rule, eliminating the Serbian state outright by 1459. In the meantime, from the 17th to the 19th of October 1448, the second Battle of Kosovo came and went and with it went the Albanians' hero Skanderbeg's opportunity to score a significant victory against the Ottomans; he was defending his northern Albanian territory against the Venetians until shortly before the battle and, meeting routed troops on his way, left before he had arrived, maintaining his territory until his death in 1468.

Rebellions were frequent but fruitless. The Ottoman Empire was only dislodged in late 1689 and only then by the Austrian Empire. The Austrian Empire retreated in early 1690, the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church and many Serb refugees following, after which the Ottoman Empire reasserted itself.

A revolt, led by Serbs but involving Albanians, began in 1804; although it extended as far south as northern Kosovo and although the Ottoman Empire retook the territory, renewed fighting led the Ottomans to allow Belgrade district to administer itself, agreed in 1815 and instituted in 1817. Its independence was recognised in 1878.

Cooperation between Serbian and Albanian territories faltered after 1804, when Serbia began to deal with its Muslim and Albanian minorities antagonistically and violently. Ottomans' desire for a control on Slav nationalism and Serbs' desire for a distraction that would facilitate their insurrection led to responses from both that were conducive to, if they did not actively promote Albanian nationalism. Rejecting the option of a unified Albanian vilayet, the Ottomans established the vilayet of Kosovo in 1877; by this time, although Orthodox Serbs constituted a majority in some south-eastern areas, Muslim Albanians were the majority in Kosovo.

In 1877 an "Albanian committee" was set up that sent a memorandum to the Ottomans petitioning for Albanian unification and autonomy. Proposals for Serbian annexation of northern Kosovo and the implementation of a compromise that included excision of the predominantly Albanian Gusinje from the vilayet of Kosovo and its insertion into the predominantly Slav Montenegro in 1878 incited resistance: first the Central Committee for the Defence of the Rights of the Albanian Nation, then the Albanian League of Prizren were founded to prevent annexations of Albanian territories.

In 1879, Ottoman administrative and military staff misinterpreted the dominant Albanian position and, misinformed, the Ottomans changed their minds about granting their demands. In 1880, when the Albanian community became restless for change, they wrested control of Kosovo under the League of Prizren and prepared to defend themselves, which appeared to fulfil the Ottomans' staff's prophecies. In 1881, the Ottoman Empire crushed the League and with it organised resistance in Kosovo.

From the late 1880s on, Muslim-Christian relations in Kosovo deteriorated after the Serbian government implemented a policy of ethnic cleansing. It is important to note that, even in 1912, Kosovans who identified themselves as "Serbian" were expressing their religious, more than their ethnic or national identity; in Mitrovice, for example, much to the Serbian government's dislike, some "Serbs" were identifying themselves as "Kosovans" and campaigned for "Kosovo for the Kosovans".

In 1899, Macedonians and Bulgarians started agitating for an independent Macedonia that encompassed Kosovo, as well as predominantly Albanian areas of Macedonia; in their turn, Albanians renewed their campaign for the unification of all predominantly Albanian areas, in either an Ottoman province or an independent state. At this time, the Serbian government sponsored cetas - armed bands - to combat Macedonian and Bulgarian cetas in Macedonia, but some fought against Albanians in Kosovo, so Albanian-Serb relations deteriorated further.

In 1908, the Young Turks enlisted Albanian support by pretending to share their desire for secure autonomy under the Sultanate, but in 1909, their real intentions were laid bare when they replaced the Sultan with a puppet. Along with tax collection, press-ganging and other equally unpopular actions, the Young Turks elicited Albanian revolts, which they managed to suppress.

In the spring of 1910, another tax revolt initially succeeded and spread across Kosovo, but by the summer it was quashed. By the autumn a comprehensive disarmament programme had driven the Albanians to dependence upon the government of Montenegro, which was fomenting rebellion to enable it to grab land; the government of Serbia, however, apprehensive about an expansive Austria-Hungary and reliant upon arms imported through Thessaloniki, rekindled relations with the Ottomans.

In the spring of 1911, the Montenegro-funded Albanian rebels rose up, but again, by the summer they had been subdued and by the autumn, Italy was at war with the Ottoman Empire and fearful of Christian conquest, the Albanians too accepted Ottoman rule.

In the spring of 1912, armed by the governments of Montenegro and Serbia, the Albanian rebels rose again against the Young Turks, but this time, the Ottomans couldn't subjugate them and on the 18th of August 1912, acceded to Albanian demands for autonomy. The success of the Albanian insurrection encouraged Balkan states to revolt and weakened the Ottoman Empire to the point that they were able to succeed, but that, paradoxically, led to the loss of Kosovan Albanians' autonomy.

As well as arming the Albanian rebels, Serbia and Montenegro disseminated propaganda against them, created violent incidents and stepped up their cetniks' activities. As the Ottomans withdrew, Serbia accused them of advancing and soon after, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece were at war with the Ottoman Empire; the Ottomans gradually withdrew and the Albanian fighters were overwhelmed.

During and after - and even, in the cases of surrender, without - conflict, both fighters and civilians were subjected to gross abuses, ethnic cleansing and extermination and the appropriation and destruction of Muslim and Albanian cultural heritage.

In December 1912, the Great Powers discussed how to settle the territorial disputes, and in March 1913, negotiations between Austria-Hungary and France and Russia ended in the independence of Albania, but the cession of Kosovo to Serbia and Montenegro; peculiarly, Peje/Pec was ceded to Montenegro, not Serbia, which had excused its conquest primarily by citing the rights of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate to Peje.

On the 28th of July 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia; by the end of 1915, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria occupied Kosovo, Bulgaria then conducting a programme of Bulgarianisation of its Slav subjects as Serbia had a programme of Serbianisation before. By mid-1918, Austria-Hungary and its allies were retreating and by late 1918, Serbia had reoccupied Kosovo.

On the 1st of December 1918, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (that became Yugoslavia in 1929), was established, comprised of Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and Slovenia; Kosovo was included by default, though it had not been legally incorporated into Serbia and later was only incorporated into Yugoslavia.

Subsequently, there was colonisation of predominantly Albanian areas, persecution of Albanians, suppression of Albanian cultural life and denial of the existence of an Albanian community, their identity dismissed as the false consciousness of fellow Serbs.

Consequently, the existing resistance to the return of Serbian rule was reinforced. The Committee for the National Defence of Kosovo led the resistance, campaigning diplomatically and coordinating kacaks, its rules ordering first that members did not harm Serb civilians and second that they did not destroy cultural property; when the Serbian government started creating local Serb cetas, the kacaks started attacking local Serb villages.

Colonisation of predominantly Albanian areas was facilitated by the expropriation of rebels' land and its redistribution to loyal locals, both Serb and Albanian, but also, chiefly, to the settlers, who were given larger parcels of land as well as many other benefits denied to the loyal locals; the unfair treatment commonly led to unity of local Serbs and Albanians against settler Serbs.

In 1929, in response to a murder in the Yugoslav parliament, the king implemented a more centralised, authoritarian system, with the territories reorganised to cut across customary borders; Kosovo was cut up and joined to three areas, one largely Serbian, one largely Montenegrin and one largely Macedonian.

In 1939, emulating German-Austrian Anschluss and fortifying itself against the resultant power, Italy annexed Albania; in 1941, being directed by the Nazis and trying to build a rapport with its new subjects, Italy collaborated in the invasion of Yugoslavia. Kosovo was again divided up, slivers of the north and the east taken by Germany and Bulgaria, respectively, whilst the majority of Kosovo was taken by Italy and put under the civil administration of Albania, where it stayed under the control of the Nazis when Italy surrendered in 1943.

Whilst the cetniks and the Communists played an insignificant part in the Second World War in Kosovo, because they were perceived as Slav organisations committed to Yugoslav unity, the Allies were seen as forces that could be used to achieve Albanians' liberation and were collaborated with. Notably, the Axis Powers were also seen in this way and instrumentalist collaboration with the Nazis was unusually common in Kosovo; however, the Albanian Skanderbeg volunteer SS division, which committed the most disgraceful act of that war in Kosovo when it deported 281 Jews, was still so hampered by desertion and disobedience that the Nazis judged it of no military value. After the Nazis retreated, the Partisan, Russian and Bulgarian troops occupied Kosovo.

Under Tito, colonisation of Kosovo and suppression of Albanian culture were ended and Kosovo was made relatively autonomous; nevertheless, it was also under Tito that Muslim culture was suppressed, that an imbalance of power induced reactive community politics in Kosovo and that a collapsing economy in a dysfunctional state [was created, which later] enabled Milosevic to come to power in Yugoslavia.

On the 3rd September 1945, it was written into law that Kosovo was an autonomous region in Serbia in Yugoslavia, different aspects of the processes of determining its status and implementing that determination having been taken up since by Serbian and Albanian nationalists; however, all of the relevant decisions on Kosovo's status were made undemocratically and whatever legal force they may have carried was simply a product of the power of the dictatorship that made the law as it chose.

As the rest of Yugoslavia produced more and earned more, the underdeveloped and under-funded Kosovo became relatively poorer. At the same time as clamping down on Islamic life, identification as "Turks" - a term popularly used as a synonym for Muslims - was encouraged and many duly adopted it; in 1953, a treaty between Yugoslavia and Greece and Turkey enabled a mass emigration of Yugoslav Turks and so a mass reduction in the Albanian community in Kosovo, suggesting a long-held plan coming to fruition.

In 1963, constitutional changes appeared to imply that Kosovo was merely a region of Serbia, but in 1966, the Serbian nationalist Minister of the Interior was dismissed and in response to protests in 1968, further constitutional changes established the autonomous provinces as "socio-political communities" like the republics and, in 1974, established the units' equality in nature and rights.

On the 11th of March 1981, a student protest against living conditions turned into an attack on the regime and on the 25th of March, another protest turned into a pro-autonomy demonstration, both being baton-charged and tear-gassed into submission. On the 1st of April, school pupils joined the protests and later, despite the deployment of tanks, so did manual labourers; when the protests spread across Kosovo, a state of emergency was declared and a curfew imposed.

By the mid-1980s, the "culture war" was well under way and both sides were using ancient and recent histories to corroborate their rights-claims to the territory of Kosovo; nationalists were fabricating histories from 'myths and truths' in order to verify their interpretations (Mertus, 1999: 1).

The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, leaked in 1986, was a prime example of these fabrications, accusing Albanians of the genocide of Serbs; its contents were repudiated by many Communist leaders, but Milosevic and his ilk realised its potential.

On the 24th of April 1987, anti-nationalist Serbian Communist party president Stambolic opted against speaking to a Serb nationalist demonstration, sending Milosevic instead. Local troublemakers had arranged for a lorry loaded with rocks to be within reach of the demonstrators precisely in order to goad the police into a violent reaction, which they could then use as nationalist propaganda. Milosevic bought into this, announcing to the crowd that "no one should dare to beat you!" He and other Serbian nationalists also used a mentally ill Albanian soldier's killing of his colleagues as evidence of the alleged genocide and by the end of 1987, by scapegoating the Albanians and undermining his political rivals, Milosevic became Serbian Communist party president. Repeating these strategies in Vojvodina then Montenegro, Milosevic installed puppets.

When, in 1988, Milosevic tried to purge Kosovo's government, there were widespread protests; on the 17th of November, Trepca/Trepca's miners marched on Prishtine and on the 18th, workers, students and school pupils joined them, but the Kosovan assembly acceded to the Serbian demands. The very next day Milosevic held his biggest rally, with at least 350,000 in attendance.

When, early in 1989, a bundle of measures designed to subject Kosovo to Serbia's will roused yet more protests and strikes throughout Kosovo, including the Trepca miners occupying the mines, the Serbian government pretended to give in, but as soon as the strikers emerged onto the streets, a state of emergency was declared and many of the protestors were arrested. On the 23rd of March 1989, under extreme duress - with tanks outside and security police inside - the Kosovan assembly accepted the Serbian party's revisions. Violent protests erupted immediately, but they were subjugated quickly.

In the spring of 1990, the nerve toxin Sarin somehow arrived in some Albanian schoolchildren's systems, making them very ill; some of the outraged Albanians attacked local Serbs' homes, giving Milosevic and his cronies a pretext for yet another crackdown.

On the 26th of June 1990, Serbia intensified its cultural, social and economic persecution of Albanians and, when the Kosovan assembly tried to block it and instead propose the recognition of Kosovo as a republic, the Serb controlling the assembly adjourned the meeting.

On the 2nd July 1990, when the Kosovan assembly was not recalled as promised, it met anyway and declared Kosovo a republic, to which Serbia responded by dissolving Kosovo's government. On the 7th September, a democratic constitution for a sovereign, independent Kosovo was made public, which was accepted by referendum in 1991 and on the 24th of May 1992, secret voting elected a democratic government for Kosovo.

From then on, the Serbian government's harrying of Kosovo Albanians was carried into every aspect of life and when Serbia attacked Bosnia-Hercegovina, Bosniak and Albanian identities were collapsed into a singular "Muslim" identity, as they were caricatured as Islamic fundamentalists set on holy war against Christian Europeans. Under Rugova's leadership, Kosovo Albanians responded by appealing for international intervention, employing non-violent resistance and maintaining an autonomous administration, complete with education and health systems, funded by a voluntary tax on emigres.

When the war against Bosnia-Hercegovina ended, the situation in Kosovo did not get better and though Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo were still respected, their tactics were discredited; indeed, with Milosevic lauded as a peacemaker and only token sanctions against Serbia remaining to encourage the government to improve its human rights record, it appeared that the international community had abandoned the Kosovo Albanians to their plight.

To some, insurrection seemed the only option - and once the armed revolts had elicited grossly excessive clampdowns, many more agreed. The popularity of the Kosovo Liberation Army gave Milosevic an excuse to launch a campaign of violence against the Albanian community, expelling 250,000 people in 1998; when he prepared to repeat that campaign in 1999, he ignored international pressure - and threats - to back down and NATO intervened.

By the time Milosevic had withdrawn his troops from Kosovo, NATO troops had entered and the UN Kosovo Force (KFOR) had been mobilised in June 1999, in addition to the 10,000 people who had been killed and the 800,000 who had been displaced (Rechel, Schwalbe and McKee, 2004: 540), 70,000 of Kosovo's 500,000 homes had been reduced to rubble and 207 of its 609 mosques had been damaged or destroyed (Herscher and Riedlmayer, 2000: 111-112).

Kosovo was made a UN protectorate and its status has not yet been decided. Between 1999 and 2003, more than 100 Orthodox churches, monasteries and other buildings were demolished (O'Hara, 2004).

During the 17th-18th March 2004 riots, in which 19 people were killed and 1138 injured, around 730 homes occupied by minority communities' members - mostly Kosovo Serbs - and 36 Orthodox churches, monasteries and other buildings were damaged or destroyed (UNMIK, 2005: 1).

Bibliography:

Almond, M. 1994: Europe's backyard war: The war in the Balkans. London: Mandarin.
Anzulovic, B. 1999: Heavenly Serbia: From myth to genocide. London: C. Hurst and Co. (Publishers) Ltd.
Carmichael, C. 2002: Ethnic cleansing in the Balkans: Nationalism and the destruction of community. London: Routledge.
Cohen, L J. 1993: Broken bonds: Yugoslavia's disintegration and Balkan politics in transition. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
Denich, B. 2000: "Unmaking ethnicity in Yugoslavia: Media and metamorphosis". In Halpern, J M and Kideckel, D A, (Eds.). Neighbours at war: Anthropological perspectives on Yugoslav ethnicity, culture and history, 39-55. University Park, Pennsylvania: the Pennsylvania State University Press.
Denitch, B. 1996: Ethnic nationalism: The tragic death of Yugoslavia. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Glenny, M. 1999: The Balkans: Nationalism, war and the Great Powers, 1804-1999. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd.
Gordy, E D. 1999: The culture of power in Serbia: Nationalism and the destruction of alternatives. Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Lampe, J R. 2000: Yugoslavia as history: Twice there was a country. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Magas, B. 1993: The destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracing the break-up, 1980-1992. London: Verso.
Malcolm, N. 1998: Kosovo: A short history. London: Macmillan.
Meier, V. 1999: Yugoslavia: A history of its demise. London: Routledge.
Mertus, J A. 1999: Kosovo: How myths and truths started a war. London: University of California Press.
Poulton, H. 1997: "Islam, ethnicity and state in the contemporary Balkans". In Poulton, H and Taji-Farouki, S, (Eds.). Muslim identity and the Balkan state, 13-32. London: Hurst and Company and Islamic Council.
Poulton, H and Vickers, M. 1997: "The Kosovo Albanians: Ethnic confrontation with the Slav state". In Poulton, H and Taji-Farouki, S, (Eds.). Muslim identity and the Balkan state, 139-169. London: Hurst and Company and Islamic Council.
Pratt, J C. 2003: Class, nation and identity: The anthropology of political movements. London: Pluto Press.
Ramet, S P. 2002: Balkan Babel: The disintegration of Yugoslavia from the death of Tito to the fall of Milosevic. London: Westview Press.
Samary, C. 1995: Yugoslavia dismembered. New York, New York: Monthly Review Press.
Sell, L. 2002: Slobodan Milosevic and the destruction of Yugoslavia. London: Duke University Press.
Simic, A. 2000: "Nationalism as a folk ideology: The case of former Yugoslavia". In Halpern, J M and Kideckel, D A, (Eds.). Neighbours at war: Anthropological perspectives on Yugoslav ethnicity, culture and history, 103-115. University Park, Pennsylvania: the Pennsylvania State University Press.
Vincent, J A. 1999: "Symbols of nationalism in Bosnia and Hercegovina". In Cameron, K, Ed.). National identity, 46-63. Exeter: Intellect Books.

[Bibliography added on the 2nd of January 2006; work in progress.]

Formatting has been changed to make it easy to read in a blog. Footnotes have been put in brackets below the paragraph they were linked to. Photographs have been replaced with links to those photos within the given place's blog. Some text has been written in bold to help searches.

Kosovo media say Ahtisaari to present proposal on Kosovo's status in September

2006-08-13T23:04:00.000+01:00

PRISTINA, Aug 11 (Hina) - The UN chief negotiator for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, could present his proposal for Kosovo's status as early as September 1, the Albanian-language media in Pristina quoted sources in the UN.Ahtisaari is expected to present his position on Kosovo's status at a session of the UN Security Council early in September since it is becoming less and less likely that Belgrade and Pristina will reach an agreement on the matter.According to the Kosovo media, senior UN officials in New York have started adjusting positions of the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia and China on outstanding global issues, including Kosovo.

NATO's Objectives In Kosovo

2006-08-05T16:15:00.000+01:00

NATO's objectives
NATO's objectives in relation to the conflict in Kosovo were set out in the Statement issued at the Extraordinary Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO on 12 April 1999 and were reaffirmed by Heads of State and Government in Washington on 23 April 1999:

a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression;

the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces;

the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;

the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations;

the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords, in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.
Throughout the conflict, the achievement of these objectives, accompanied by measures to ensure their full implementation, has been regarded by the Alliance as the prerequisite for bringing to an end the violence and human suffering in Kosovo.

Background to the Conflict kosovo

2006-08-05T16:12:00.000+01:00

Background to the conflict
Kosovo lies in southern Serbia and has a mixed population of which the majority are ethnic Albanians. Until 1989, the region enjoyed a high degree of autonomy within the former Yugoslavia, when Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic altered the status of the region, removing its autonomy and bringing it under the direct control of Belgrade, the Serbian capital. The Kosovar Albanians strenuously opposed the move.

During 1998, open conflict between Serbian military and police forces and Kosovar Albanian forces resulted in the deaths of over 1,500 Kosovar Albanians and forced 400,000 people from their homes. The international community became gravely concerned about the escalating conflict, its humanitarian consequences, and the risk of it spreading to other countries. President Milosevic's disregard for diplomatic efforts aimed at peacefully resolving the crisis and the destabilising role of militant Kosovar Albanian forces was also of concern.

On 28 May 1998, the North Atlantic Council, meeting at Foreign Minister level, set out NATO's two major objectives with respect to the crisis in Kosovo, namely:

to help to achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis by contributing to the response of the international community;
to promote stability and security in neighbouring countries with particular emphasis on Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1).
On 12 June 1998 the North Atlantic Council, meeting at Defence Minister level, asked for an assessment of possible further measures that NATO might take with regard to the developing Kosovo Crisis. This led to consideration of a large number of possible military options.

On 13 October 1998, following a deterioration of the situation, the NATO Council authorised Activation Orders for air strikes. This move was designed to support diplomatic efforts to make the Milosevic regime withdraw forces from Kosovo, cooperate in bringing an end to the violence and facilitate the return of refugees to their homes. At the last moment, following further diplomatic initiatives including visits to Belgrade by NATO's Secretary General Solana, US Envoys Holbrooke and Hill, the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, General Naumann, and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Clark, President Milosevic agreed to comply and the air strikes were called off.

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1199, among other things, expressed deep concern about the excessive use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav army, and called for a cease-fire by both parties to the conflict. In the spirit of the UNSCR, limits were set on the number of Serbian forces in Kosovo, and on the scope of their operations, following a separate agreement with Generals Naumann and Clark.

It was agreed, in addition, that the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would establish a Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) to observe compliance on the ground and that NATO would establish an aerial surveillance mission. The establishment of the two missions was endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1203. Several non-NATO nations that participate in Partnership for Peace (PfP) agreed to contribute to the surveillance mission organised by NATO.

In support of the OSCE, the Alliance established a special military task force to assist with the emergency evacuation of members of the KVM, if renewed conflict should put them at risk. This task force was deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1) under the overall direction of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Despite these steps, the situation in Kosovo flared up again at the beginning of 1999, following a number of acts of provocation on both sides and the use of excessive and disproportionate force by the Serbian Army and Special Police. Some of these incidents were defused through the mediation efforts of the OSCE verifiers but in mid-January, the situation deteriorated further after escalation of the Serbian offensive against Kosovar Albanians.

Renewed international efforts were made to give new political impetus to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. The six-nation Contact Group (2) established by the 1992 London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia met on 29 January. It was agreed to convene urgent negotiations between the parties to the conflict, under international mediation.

OSCE vehicles pull out of Yugoslavia on 20 March 1999. (Belga photo)
NATO supported and reinforced the Contact Group efforts by agreeing on 30 January to the use of air strikes if required, and by issuing a warning to both sides in the conflict. These concerted initiatives culminated in initial negotiations in Rambouillet near Paris, from 6 to 23 February, followed by a second round in Paris, from 15 to 18 March. At the end of the second round of talks, the Kosovar Albanian delegation signed the proposed peace agreement, but the talks broke up without a signature from the Serbian delegation.

Immediately afterwards, Serbian military and police forces stepped up the intensity of their operations against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, moving extra troops and modern tanks into the region, in a clear breach of compliance with the October agreement. Tens of thousands of people began to flee their homes in the face of this systematic offensive.

On 20 March, the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission was withdrawn from the region, having faced obstruction from Serbian forces to the extent that they could no longer continue to fulfil their task. US Ambassador Holbrooke then flew to Belgrade, in a final attempt to persuade President Milosevic to stop attacks on the Kosovar Albanians or face imminent NATO air strikes.
A US F-15E Strike Eagle takes off.

Milosevic refused to comply, and on 23 March the order was given to commence air strikes (Operation Allied Force).

On 10 June 1999, after an air campaign lasting seventy-seven days, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana announced that he had instructed General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, temporarily to suspend NATO's air operations against Yugoslavia. This decision was taken after consultations with the North Atlantic Council and confirmation from General Clark that the full withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo had begun.

The withdrawal was in accordance with a Military-Technical Agreement concluded between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the evening of 9 June. The agreement was signed by Lt. General Sir Michael Jackson, on behalf of NATO, and by Colonel General Svetozar Marjanovic of the Yugoslav Army and Lieutenant General Obrad Stevanovic of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, on behalf of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republic of Serbia. The withdrawal was also consistent with the agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the European Union and Russian special envoys, President Ahtisaari of Finland and Mr. Victor Chernomyrdin, former Prime Minister of Russia, reached on 3 June.

The NATO Secretary General announced that he had written to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, and to the President of the United Nations Security Council, informing them of these developments. The Secretary General of NATO urged all parties to the conflict to seize the opportunity for peace and called on them to comply with their obligations under the agreements which had now been concluded and under all relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

Paying tribute to General Clark and to the forces which had contributed to Operation Allied Force, and to the cohesion and determination of all the Allies, the Secretary General stated that NATO was ready to undertake its new mission to bring the people back to their homes and to build a lasting and just peace in Kosovo.

On 10 June the UN Security Council passed a resolution (UNSCR 1244) welcoming the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis, including an immediate end to violence and a rapid withdrawal of its military, police and paramilitary forces. The Resolution, adopted by a vote of 14 in favour and none against, with one abstention (China), announced the Security Council's decision to deploy international civil and security presences in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices.

Presidents and premiers hold first Kosovo meet

2006-07-26T20:51:00.000+01:00

VIENNA: The presidents and prime ministers from Belgrade and Pristina plan to congregate in Vienna today for the first direct talks on the future status of the Serbian province of Kosovo, which has been under UN administration since 1999. By invitation of UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari, those taking part include Serbian President Boris Tadic, Premier Vojislav Kostunica and Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic. On the Pristina side, President Fatmir Sejdiu, Prime Minister Agim Ceku and Speaker of Parliament Kole Berisha plan to attend. Each side is expected to have a total of about 15 delegates.

Attending on Pristina’s side are politicians who already took part in the failed Rambouillet Kosovo peace negotiations more than seven years ago, including then delegation chief and present opposition politician Hashim Thaci and leader of the Ora movement Veton Surroi. The opposing views are still far apart. On Saturday, Kostunica said: “The sooner the dangerous idea is forgotten of setting up a new state on the territory of Serbia, the better for us all, and certainly also for the lasting stability of the region as a whole.” But the Pristina side continues to say that full independence is the only acceptable

solution. A major breakthrough is not expected in Vienna. Belgrade sources already term Ahtisaari’s task of reconciling two diametrically opposed views as “mission impossible.” The Belgrade newspaper Blic said on Friday that the US had drafted a plan for Serbia’s future international status. It included “conditional independence” for Kosovo by autumn 2007, and Serbia’s European Union accession by 2014. On Saturday, Foreign Minister of the summit’s host-nation Austria Ursula Plassnik appealed to the two sides to use the opportunity. “Belgrade and Pristina have the chance now, with the help of the international community, to reach a negotiated solution. There must be more realism and commitment,” she said.

G8 ministers favor direct talks on Kosovo between Pristina, Belgrade

2006-07-26T20:49:00.000+01:00

G8 ministers favor direct talks on Kosovo between Pristina, Belgrade
MOSCOW. June 29 (Interfax) - G8 foreign ministers have called for direct negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade on the Kosovo problem, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on Thursday.

"We have discussed the situation on the western Balkans and called for further direct negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, and the involvement of Kosovo Serbs in the negotiations," he said.

Pristina and Belgrade to hold new round of talks on cultural and religious sites

2006-07-26T20:48:00.000+01:00

With another session of negotiations scheduled for 11 July, the Kosovo Albanian delegation says it is unwilling to accept new demands for protection zones. Meanwhile, a group of Catholic and Orthodox bishops has called on both sides to negotiate in good faith.

By Blerta Foniqi for Southeast European Times in Pristina - 04/07/06

The Kosovo Albanian side disputes calls for a protection zone around the Gracanica monastery. [Getty Images]

Kosovo's negotiating team has agreed to participate in another session of direct talks with Belgrade on cultural heritage in Kosovo, to be held on 11 July in Vienna. Yet the Kosovo side says it will not accept new demands regarding protection zones around Serb Orthodox cultural and religious sites.

"We are against compromise on this issue," said a spokesperson for the negotiating team, Skender Hyseni. He said the team would examine new proposals from a UN-sponsored working group, but that no more room exists for concessions.

UN Deputy Special Envoy Albert Rohan's office has assembled a group consisting of representatives from Serbia and Kosovo -- as well as from international institutions such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe -- to tackle the issue on a case by case basis. On Thursday (6 July), Rohan will arrive in Pristina to discuss the upcoming session. He will bring with him 12 maps illustrating possible religious protection zones around various sites.

But the Kosovo negotiators have already indicated they regard some of these as untenable.

"For example, the Gracanica monastery. How can it have a protection zone, while one of the main roads crosses near the important religious building?" Hyseni added.

Envoy for status talks Martti Ahtisaari's office denied on Monday that Belgrade has put in any official request to adjourn the next round of talks. The co-ordinator for the Serbian negotiating team, Slobodan Samardzic, had earlier said the Serbian government wanted to postpone the meeting, since both he and Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica will be on a visit to the United States at the time.

Meanwhile, a group of Catholic and Orthodox bishops has asked Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leaders to negotiate in "good faith" over the political future of Kosovo, which is currently under UN administration.

The bishops also called for the safe return of 200,000 Serbs and other minorities who have left Kosovo as a result of violence there.

"Only through a real dialogue of mutual respect and good-faith negotiations can justice become a reality in Kosovo," said a statement issued by the Joint Commission of Orthodox and Catholic Bishops, meeting in Washington.

The commission is composed of US Catholic bishops and Orthodox bishops from Canada and the United States. It deals with ways in which the two churches can co-operate on practical issues.

Belgrade changes worry Kosovo

2006-05-08T17:39:00.000+01:00

Just over a year ago Albanian dreams of an independent Kosovo were riding high.

Slobodan Milosevic was the West's number one enemy, and Nato troops had marched into the province ensuring, in the minds of many Albanians, that the Yugoslav Army would never return.

But now the West is courting Yugoslavia's new President Vojislav Kostunica many Albanian politicians fear their hopes of achieving statehood are dashed.